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Abstract. In this paper we report about a case study on the func-
tional verification of a System on Chip (SoC) with a formal system-level
model. Our approach improves industrial simulation-based verification
techniques in two aspects. First, we suggest to use the formal model to
assess the sanity of an interface verification unit. Second, we present a
two-step approach to generate clever semi-directed test cases from tem-
poral logic properties: model-based testing tools of the CADP toolbox
generate system-level abstract test cases, which are then refined with a
commercial Coverage-Directed Test Generation tool into interface-level
concrete test cases that can be executed at RTL level. Applied to an
AMBA 4 ACE-based cache-coherent SoC, we found that our approach
helps in the transition from interface-level to system-level verification,
facilitates the validation of system-level properties, and enables early
detection of bugs in both the SoC and the commercial test-bench.
1 Introduction
Due to increasing design complexity, functional verification continues to be one of
the most expensive and time-consuming steps in a typical System-on-Chip (SoC)
design flow. In practice, most widely used techniques are based on extensive sim-
ulation due to the related flexibility. However, the success of simulation-based
verification, both in terms of total effort spent and final verification coverage
achieved, depends heavily on the quality of the tests executed during simula-
tion. Generating tests to achieve high coverage for complex designs has always
been a challenging problem. In general, more constrained and less random tests
reduce the overall validation effort, because the same verification coverage can
be achieved with fewer and shorter tests [19]. We distinguish in this paper three
types of test generation techniques with decreasing degree of randomness: fully
random, constrained-random [26], and fully specified tests, hereafter called di-
rected tests, i.e., without randomization.
Fully random tests are the easiest to automate, but require long simulation
runs to obtain a reasonable coverage. In many situations, directed tests are the
only tests that can thoroughly verify corner cases and important features of
a design [2, 15]. However, because directed tests are mostly written manually,
it is impractical to generate a comprehensive set of directed tests to achieve a
coverage goal [19]. Automatic test generation using model checking is one of
the most promising approaches for directed test generation. However, for large
designs model checking rapidly faces state explosion, when considering hardware
protocols in all their details.
Constrained-random testing uses constraint solvers to select tests satisfying
a specified set of constraints; non-specified details are then filled in by random-
ization. The automation of the feedback from coverage analysis to constrained-
random test generation led to coverage-directed test generation (CDTG) [22],
which dynamically analyzes coverage results and automatically adapts the ran-
domized test generation process to improve the coverage. CDTG is guided by
different coverage metrics, such as state coverage and transition coverage [2] and
shows various degrees of success [11]. For instance, it succeeds to achieve coverage
goals for interface hardware protocols, but reaches its limits for complex system-
level protocols, such as system-level cache coherency. Achieving good coverage
for these recent protocols is a new challenge in the development of industrial
test benches and calls for more directed and less random tests.
This paper is about the application of formal methods to improve the func-
tional verification of a heterogeneous cache-coherent SoC for a commercial set-
top-box supporting multiple Ultra HD flows on a single chip currently under
development at STMicroelectronics. We use an extension of a previously devel-
oped system-level formal model of a cache-coherent SoC [16] and take advantage
of equivalence checking, model checking, and test generation facilities offered by
the CADP toolbox4 [8].
The two principal contributions of this paper are the following.
1. A way to assess the sanity of an industrial interface verification unit (ivunit),
consisting of a set of behaviors to cover. In our study, we focus on the complex
behaviors expressed by so-called checks of a commercial ivunit.
2. A two-step approach to use model-based testing to generate clever semi-
directed system level test cases from temporal logic properties. We use CADP
to generate directed “abstract” system-level test cases, which are then refined
with commercial CDTG tool into interface-level “concrete” test cases that
can be executed at RTL level. Those tests concern system-level properties
in the sense that several interfaces are activated. We propose the notion of
a system verification unit (svunit) to measure the coverage and verdicts of
system-level properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work.
Section 3 recalls the main aspects of the considered SoC and its formal model [16].
Section 4 presents contribution 1 by describing the validation of an industrial
ivunit using equivalence checking. Section 5 details contribution 2 by proposing
our test generation methodology based on counterexamples generated by model
checking. Section 6 presents experimental results and the industrial impact of
our work. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
4 http://cadp.inria.fr/
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2 Related Work
For instance, the specification-based test generation technique [21] uses a formal
model to generate directed tests. Solutions based on model checking techniques
are promising for functional verification and test generation for reasonably com-
plex systems [10]. However, it is unrealistic to assume that a complete detailed
model of a large SoC is tractable by a model checker. We address this issue by re-
lying on a system-level model, abstracting from all irrelevant details. In this way,
we succeed to model a complex industrial SoC and to extract relevant scenarios
by model checking. The above approaches transform counterexamples produced
by the model checker into test cases. In our approach, we use the counterexam-
ples to produce smaller interesting configurations of the model that still do not
satisfy a given property. We generate test cases from these smaller models, thus
avoiding combinatorial explosion in many cases.
In the literature, it has already been proposed to mix model-based tech-
niques and coverage-directed techniques. Coverage-directed techniques were used
in property learning [4] (“reuse learned knowledge from one core to another”),
which we do not use, and that relies on SAT-based BMC (whereas CADP im-
plements totally different verification techniques). Some of those techniques [21]
focus on homogeneous multicore architectures (exploiting symmetry between
processors to reduce verification complexity), and only suggest how this could
be extended to heterogeneous architectures (by grouping IPs into homogeneous
groups to be studied separately). On the contrary, our approach was designed
for heterogeneous SoCs and makes no symmetry assumption. Also, most of those
techniques [4, 5, 21] remain at system level (SystemC-TLM level), whereas our
approach starts from system level and goes down to RTL level.
Over the last two decades, the CADP toolbox has been used for verifying
numerous complex hardware designs, including Bull supercomputers, STMicro-
electronics multiprocessor architectures, Networks-on-Chip (CEA/Leti and Uni-
versity of Utah), and various asynchronous circuits. In this paper, we present an
application of the latest languages and tools of CADP. Using the new genera-
tion formal language LNT [3] to describe the system and also the test purposes
greatly facilitates the testing of complex behaviors. Similarly, the MCL lan-
guage [17] provides a convenient way to express complex data-based temporal
properties. We use a new prototype tool to generate tests on the fly. Finally,
instead of a homogeneous system as in [9, 14], we study the less symmetric and
thus more complex case of an heterogeneous SoC.
3 Formal Model of an AMBA 4 ACE based SoC
The recent AMBA 4 ACE (AXI Coherency Extension) protocol [1, 23], proposed
by ARM, extends the AMBA 3 AXI protocol in order to support system-level
cache coherency in SoCs. AXI defines communication at interface-level between
a pair of master/slave ports, which are connected by several read and write
channels (AR, R, AW, W, B). AXI defines two transactions Read and Write, each of
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which consists of several transfers; each transfer is executed on an AXI channel.
Thanks to the encapsulation mechanisms of AXI, a transfer on a channel can be
considered to be atomic at higher levels.
ACE introduces system-level requirements on transaction ordering, adds co-
herency channels (AC, CR, CD), enriches existing channels with new coherency
parameters (i.e., PassDirty, IsShared), and defines cache line states and several
transactions (i.e., coherent transactions, cache maintenance transactions, mem-
ory update transactions, etc.). ACE introduces heterogeneity by defining two
types of coherent masters: those with a cache are called ACE masters, and those
without caches are called ACE-Lite masters. The latter can access data in the
caches of the former, avoiding access to memory, which improves performance.
Example 1. The ReadOnce transaction is a coherent transaction (used in partic-
ular by an ACE-Lite master), which obtains the current contents of a memory
line without keeping a copy into the cache. If an ACE-Lite master sends a Read-
Once transfer on the AR channel. The CCI then sends snoop requests to all ACE
masters on the AC channels. Each ACE master answers on the CR channel with
a Boolean indicating whether the data is in its cache, and a Boolean indicating
if the master passes the responsibility of writing back the data in the memory
(PassDirty). If the data is available, the ACE master sends also a data transfer
on the CD channel. If none of the master has the data available, it is taken from
the main memory. The CCI forwards the data to the ACE-Lite master using the
R channel, to complete the transaction. If one of the ACE masters passed the
responsibility to write back the data, the CCI must initiate a memory update,
because an ACE-Lite master cannot take this responsibility.
We use an extension of a previously developed formal model [16] (about
3400 lines of LNT code) of an ACE-based SoC5, consisting of a cache-coherent
interconnect (CCI) connected to a non-cache-coherent Network-on-Chip (NoC).
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the model in the configuration used
in the present paper. Following the ARM R© big.LITTLETM solution [20], the
two ACE masters are one big (powerful) and one little (lower-power) processor,
enabling to dynamically adapt to changing computation load. The ACE-Lite
master is a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) that can access the caches of both
processors. All three masters access the main memory through a non-cache-
coherent NoC. The ACE protocol supports the coherency of data among the
processors. Our formal model focuses on the cache-coherent part of the SoC.
The ACE specification contains some global requirements. Indeed, the ACE
protocol does not guarantee system level cache coherency, but just provides sup-
port for it. Coherency has to be ensured by proprietary additional mechanisms
on each implementation of a CCI. We model these global requirements in a
constraint-oriented style by adding observer processes that prohibit incorrect
executions. By omitting those observers, we obtain an unconstrained model, for
which the global requirements are not necessarily satisfied.
5 A large Petri net derived from our LNT model is available as Model Checking Contest
2014 benchmark (http://mcc.lip6.fr/pdf/ARMCacheCoherence-form.pdf).
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Fig. 1. Model architecture
A crucial feature of our formal model is that it is parametrized, in particular
by the set of forbidden ACE transactions, the number of ACE masters, ACE-Lite
masters, and cache lines per ACE master. Among the three masters, at most two
initiate transactions at the same time. We will vary essentially one parameter,
which is the set of forbidden ACE transactions; we refer to an instance of the
model as Model(F), where F is the set of forbidden ACE transactions; thus,
Model(∅) corresponds to the complete, unconstrained model.
4 Sanity of a Formal Check List
Industrial CDTG test benches are based on a so-called verification plan, i.e.,
a list of all behaviors to be covered by tests on the Design Under Verification
(DUV). The coverage of the verification plan is collected to measure test pro-
gression.6 In our work, we focus on the formal checks, which are grouped in
so-called interface verification units (ivunit). Each check is an event sequence,
e.g., expressed in Property Specification Language (PSL) [12]. Covering a check
consists in activating the check and finishing correctly the specified sequence.
Activating a check means to detect the first event of the sequence. It is a failure
if a check is activated and not correctly finished.
In this section, we report about the use of our formal model to validate a
commercial ivunit. To this end, we encode each check of the ivunit as a Labeled
Transition System (LTS) (by means of an LNT model) and use equivalence
checking techniques (hiding, minimization, and comparison operations on LTSs).
In fact, the ivunit considers only a single interface (i.e., a single master/slave
pair), whereas the formal model describes the complete SoC. To obtain the LTS
of the interface between ACE master 1 (big) and the CCI (upper left part of
Fig. 1), we hide in the LTS of the whole system all labels except those of the
6 There are two types of behaviors in a verification plan: simple behaviors, called cover
points and complex behaviors, called (formal) checks.
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selected interface and then minimize the resulting LTS according to divergence-
sensitive branching bisimulation (divbranching) [25], which preserves the branch-
ing structure and livelocks (cycles of internal τ -transitions). Applying those steps
reduces the LTS as generated from the model (498,197 states, 1,343,799 transi-
tions) by two orders of magnitude (3,653 states, 8,924 transitions). We store the
reduced LTS in a file named interface.bcg, where the extension .bcg stands for
Binary Coded Graph, the compact binary format used to store LTSs in CADP.
We continue our study by identifying a subset of nine industrial checks (called
C1 ... C9), which have a level of abstraction corresponding to our formal model.
Then we verify that each check is an overapproximation of the model behavior.
Last, we study if the list of checks covers all behaviors of the model.
4.1 Local Sanity of Each Check
We aim at verifying that each check is well specified. Because each check uses
only a subset of interface channels, we generate a corresponding sub-interface
by hiding all channels except those occurring in the check, and apply again
divbranching reduction.
Example 2. Check C1 requires that the current read request address should not
overlap with any of the outstanding write requests. C1 uses only three channels:
address read (AR), address write (AW), and write response (B). Thus we obtain
the corresponding sub-interface LTS (105 states, 474 transitions).
We verify that each sub-interface LTS is included in the corresponding check
LTS modulo the preorder of the divbranching bisimulation. We conclude that
the check is a correct overapproximation of the behavior of the subset of ACE
channels.
4.2 Global Sanity of the List of Checks
To verify that the list of checks covers all the behaviors of the interface model, we
compare the parallel composition of all the nine checks with the interface LTS.
We use smart reduction [6] to automatically optimize the order of composing
and minimizing the checks in the parallel composition: the complete composition
process takes approximately five minutes. We express the parallel composition
in SVL with an LNT-style parallel composition operation: each check is required
to synchronize on all the gates (channels) it uses; synchronization is n-ary, i.e.,
all checks that have a given channel (e.g., AR) in their synchronization set (on
the left of ->) synchronize on the channel (e.g., C1, C2, C3, C5 all together
synchronize on AR).
"all_checks.bcg" = smart divbranching reduction of
par AR, AW, B -> "C1.lnt"
|| AR, AW, R, B -> "C2.lnt"
|| AR, R -> "C3.lnt"
|| AW, B -> "C4.lnt"
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|| AR, AW, R, B -> "C5.lnt"
|| AW, B, CD -> "C6.lnt"
|| AC, CD -> "C7.lnt"
|| AC, CR -> "C8.lnt"
|| R -> "C9.lnt"
end par;
We compare the interface LTS and the checks LTS all checks.bcg (11,773
states, 8,171,497 transitions) to verify if the interface LTS is included in the LTS
all checks.bcgmodulo the preorder corresponding to the divbranching bisimu-
lation. This verification fails, i.e., we detect a missing check ; the counterexample
(provided by CADP) shows a W label following an AW label.
According to the ACE specification, there must be the same number of W’s
and AW’s. We express this constraint by a new check (C10), avoiding the use
of counters, using asynchronous parallel composition (AW || W). Adding C10 to
the parallel composition of the checks, yields a new LTS all checks bis.bcg
(38,793 states, 27,200,587 transitions).
We compare all checks bis.bcg and interface.bcg and observe now that
interface.bcg is included in all checks bis.bcg for divbranching bisimula-
tion. Hence, the check list is now complete with respect to our formal model.
Although the missing check could also be found manually by inspecting the list
of channels in the checks (all channels but W are present), our approach has the
additional benefits of illustrating the missing behavior and enabling to formally,
and semi-automatically, establish the completeness of the check list.
5 From Temporal Logic Properties to Clever Test Cases
An interesting idea for the generation of directed tests is to focus on and derive
tests from potential faults of the DUV [18]. For system-level protocols, in order to
obtain a description of potential faults corresponding to the global requirements
of the SoC, we suggest to use system-level properties together with a model
containing faults. In our case, we use the unconstrained model (see Sec. 3).
Applying the theory of conformance testing [24], we generate abstract test cases,
which then have to be translated to the input language of a commercial CDTG
solver to randomly complete interface-level details and finally to run the tests
on the RTL test bench.
Because we found the generation of abstract test cases directly from the
complete model to be impractical, we suggest to use information contained in
counterexamples to select interesting configurations of the formal model, which
still contain violations of the global requirements, and to extract abstract test
cases from the selected configurations. Figure 2 gives an overview of our test
generation flow.
5.1 System-Level Properties
We express properties in theModel Checking Language (MCL) [17], an extension
of the modal µ-calculus with high-level operators to improve expressiveness and
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Fig. 2. Model-Based Test Generation flow
conciseness of formulæ. The main ingredients of MCL used in this paper are
action patterns extracting data values from LTS transition labels, and modalities
on transition sequences described by extended regular expressions. MCL formulæ
are verified on the fly using the EVALUATOR 4.0 model checker of CADP.
Among the properties we considered7, only the following two do not hold for
the unconstrained model.
Data Integrity. The following property [16, ϕ5], enforces correct order of write
operations to the shared memory:
[ true * .
{W !"WRITEBACK" ?c:Nat ?l:Nat ?d:Nat}. (* memory update *)
(not {W !"WRITEBACK" !0 !l !d !c})*.
{W !"WRITEBACK" !0 !l !d !c}. (* update written *)
( (not {AC ... !c ?any of Nat !l}) and
(not {W ?any of String !0 !l ?any of Nat ...}))*.
{W ?any of String !0 !l ?h:Nat ... where h<>d} (* different update *)
] false
The second line of this property matches an action corresponding to a rendezvous
on gate W with four offers: the transaction (“WRITEBACK”, i.e. a memory update),
the initiating master (the id of which is stored in variable c), the memory line
(the address of which is stored in variable l), and the data to be written (which
is stored in variable d). When this update is effectively written to memory (2nd
action on gate W), with as second offer the port number 0, i.e., the memory, the
property forbids (last action on gate W) a data h different from d to be written
to the same memory line l without previously receiving a snoop request (gate
AC) concerning line l.
7 We considered several properties, such as: absence of deadlocks, absence of livelocks,
complete execution of read and write transactions, data integrity, and coherency of
ACE-states and parameters of ACE transactions. All these properties are satisfied
by our constrained model.
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function CIC (ϕ: Property, F : Set of Transaction): Set of (Set of Transaction) is
if Model(F) |= ϕ then
return ∅
else
let ∆ be a minimal-depth counterexample ;
result := ∅ ;
for each transaction T occuring in ∆ do
result := result ∪ CIC (ϕ, F ∪ {T} )
end for ;
if result = ∅ then result := { F } end if ;
return result
end if
end function
Fig. 3. Function CIC to compute a set of interesting configurations containing faults
Unique Dirty Coherency. To verify the coherency of the ACE states of all the
caches of the system, we translated the state-based properties to action-based
properties, using information about the ACE state added to transactions issued
by cache lines. The following property [16, ϕ3] requires that if a cache line is in
the state ACE UD (the cache line is unique and modified), then as long as the line
does not change its status, all other cache lines containing the same memory line
must be in the state ACE I (the cache line is invalid)8:
[ true * .
{?Ch:String ?op:String ?m1:Nat ?indM:Nat !"ACE_UD"} .
(not({?Ch:String !m1 !indM ?s:String where s<>"ACE_UD"}))* .
{?Ch:String ?op:String ?m2:Nat !indM ?s:String
where (m2<>m1) and ace_state(s) and (s<>"ACE_I")}
] false
5.2 Computation of Interesting Configurations Containing Faults
Counterexamples of a desired property provide interesting scenarios to test cor-
ner cases. To improve test coverage, it is interesting to have as many different
counterexamples as possible. However, on-the-fly model checking provides at
most one counterexample for each property ϕ and configuration of the model,
because the model checker stops as soon as it detects a violation of the property.
Therefore, we take advantage of the parametrization of our formal model, by
varying the set F of forbidden ACE transactions, to compute with the recursive
function CIC (compute interesting configurations) shown in Fig. 3 a comprehen-
sive set of interesting configurations of the Model(F) containing faults.
Initially, all fifteen ACE transactions are allowed, i.e., we call CIC(ϕ,∅).
Function CIC proceeds as follows. First, we configure the model to exclude the
transactions in F , and model check property ϕ. If ϕ is not satisfied, the model
8 ace state(s) is a macro predicate that holds iff the string s is an ACE state.
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checker produces a counterexample ∆. We use the breadth-first search algorithm
of EVALUATOR 4.0 to produce a counterexample of minimal depth, and avoid
spurious actions in the counterexample. For each transaction T occurring in ∆,
we call CIC recursively, deactivating T in addition to F . Function CIC terminates,
because the parameter F has an upper bound (the set of all transactions) and
it strictly increases for each recursive call.
The set of interesting configurations {Model(F1),...,Model(Fn)} corre-
sponding to the set {F1, ...,Fn} computed by CIC has the following property:
a configuration Model(F ′) does not satisfy the property ϕ if and only if F ′ is
smaller than or equal to at least one combination Fi.
We applied CIC to the two properties that were invalid on the unconstrained
model (see Sec. 5.1). Altogether, Data Integrity yields 21 interesting configura-
tions (14 from an architecture with two ACE masters initiating transactions, and
7 from an architecture with one ACE-Lite master and one ACE master initiating
transactions) and Unique Dirty Coherency yields 18 interesting configurations
from an architecture with two ACE masters initiating transactions (with only
one ACE master, i.e., a single cache, Unique Dirty Coherency holds trivially).
5.3 Abstract Test Generation
We aim at generating as many tests as possible leading to invalidation of the
property for each interesting configuration. We call those tests negative tests,
because if a test succeeds, we detect a failure of the system; but if the system is
correct, all tests will fail.
Our test generation approach is based on the theory of conformance test-
ing [24], i.e., we compute from a specification of a system and a so-called test
purpose [13] a set of abstract test cases. Intuitively, a test purpose is a means to
characterize those states (called ACCEPT states) of the specification that should
be reached during test execution. To prune the search space for test cases, the
test purpose can also contain so-called REFUSE states: if such a state is reached
while testing the DUV, the test is stopped and declared inconclusive. Techni-
cally, a test purpose is provided as an LTS, e.g., an LNT model. Thus we express
the negation of each property as a test purpose in LNT.
Example 3. The LNT code for the test purpose corresponding to the Unique
Dirty Coherency is shown in Fig. 4. After an outgoing action (gates AR, AW,
and W) from an ACE master cpu1 with a cache state ACE UD (Unique Dirty), it
monitors all outgoing actions of all ACE masters. If a different ACE master cpu2
has an ACE UD state we ACCEPT the test (a coherency error has been detected).
If cpu1 performs another action with a state other than ACE UD, we REFUSE the
test (the test is inconclusive).
We use two newly developed prototype tools for test generation. A first tool
takes as input a model and a test purpose (both in LNT), and produces a Com-
plete Test Graph (CTG), i.e., an intermediate LTS containing all information to
extract (all) abstract test cases. We use a second tool to extract a set of abstract
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process main [AR, AW, CR, ACCEPT, REFUSE: any] is
var cpu1, cpu2: INDEX_CPU, state: ACE_state_t in
select
AR (?any, ?cpu1, 1, ACE_UD)
[] AW (?any, ?cpu1, 1, ACE_UD)
[] CR (?any, ?any, ?cpu1, 1, ?any, ?any, ACE_UD)
end select; -- cache line of cpu1 has unique dirty status
select
select
AR (?any, ?cpu2, 1, ACE_UD) where (cpu2<>cpu1)
[] AW (?any, ?cpu2, 1, ACE_UD) where (cpu2<>cpu1)
[] CR (?any, ?any, ?cpu2, 1, ?any, ?any, ACE_UD) where (cpu2<>cpu1)
end select;
ACCEPT -- cache lines of both cpus have unique dirty status
[]
select
AR (?any, cpu1, 1, ?state) where (state<>ACE_UD)
[] AW (?any, cpu1, 1, ?state) where (state<>ACE_UD)
[] CR (?any, ?any, cpu1, 1, ?any, ?any, ?state) where (state<>ACE_UD)
end select;
REFUSE -- cache line of cpu1 no longer has unique dirty status
end select
end var end process
Fig. 4. Unique Dirty Coherency test purpose described in LNT
test cases from the CTG. These test cases are abstract in the sense that they are
system-level automata generated from the model. Thus, those abstract test cases
have to be translated to the input language of the commercial coverage-based
solver to randomly complete the interface-level details and to run the tests on
the RTL test bench.
By extracting all test cases from each CTG and running each test case on
the industrial test bench, we obtain a locally intensive test around corner cases
specified by the global system-level properties.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our generation of abstract test cases for
a test purpose encoding the negation of a property ϕ. The first two columns
describe the property and the architecture. Columns 3 to 5 report the size of the
global CTG (produced from the unconstrained model) and the time to extract
test cases. The remaining columns give information about our approach based
on individual CTGs (produced from the interesting configurations): column 6
presents the number of CTGs, each of which is extracted from an interesting
configuration, columns 7 to 10 report the size of the largest and the smallest
CTG, and the last column gives the time to extract test cases from all the
individual CTGs. We see that the approach based on individual CTGs is much
more efficient than the extraction of test cases directly from the global CTG,
for which the extraction of test cases does not finish in half a year. Also our
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Table 1. Experimental test case extraction results
global CTG extr. nb. of largest CTG smallest CTG extr.
masters
states trans. time CTGs states trans. states trans. time
ϕ3 2ACE 6,402 14,323 >1/2 y 18 903 1,957 274 543 '7h
ϕ5
2ACE 23,032 48,543 >1/2 y 14 462 888 59 107 <1h
1ACE/1Lite 2,815 7,071 >1/2 y 7 193 394 59 107 <1h
approach reduces the size of the largest CTG by a factor of 7 for ϕ3 (Unique Dirty
Coherency), a factor of 14 for ϕ5 (Data Integrity) in the case of the architecture
with one ACE master and one ACE-Lite master initiating transactions, and a
factor of 49 for for ϕ5 in the case of the architecture with two ACE masters.
6 Industrial Results and Impact
Our formal model is used inside STMicroelectronics as a reference in discussions
with verification engineers and interconnect architects. It helps to understand
the new aspects introduced by ACE and to define the verification strategy. In
this context, the OCIS interactive step-by-step simulator with backtracking of
CADP is found useful for exhibiting execution scenarios of interest.
We also used OCIS to extract the list of possible transaction initiations for
each correct initial state of the system. A correct initial state of the system
is a correct combination of initial ACE states of the caches. For example, if a
memory line exists initially in two different caches, the state of these caches
cannot be ACE UD for both caches. So doing, we produce in less than one day
296 simple protocol tests, each of which consists of one single ACE transaction,
from request to response, including all triggered snoop requests, if any.
Using some of the counterexamples generated during the computation of the
interesting configurations (cf. Sec. 5.2), we produced also ten complex protocol
tests containing concurrency between different ACE transactions.
6.1 Making the Test Bench Ready for System-Level Verification
The original test libraries developed by the verification engineers are interface
tests. With a not so good coverage of system, new tests describing system sce-
narios are necessary. Because, system requirements cannot be verified on a single
ivunit separately, we complete the verification infrastructure and introduce the
notion of a system verification unit (svunit) connected to all ivunits, enabling
to combine behaviors of different interfaces in order to validate system-level re-
quirements. For the considered SoC, we defined an svunit consisting of 56 PSL
sequences, 56 PSL basic cover points, and 36 PSL checks. This enables to verify
on the RTL test bench that each coherent transaction produces the correspond-
ing snoop transactions, and that each snoop transaction eventually receives a
response from the snooped master.
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Further modifications of the test bench are required to enable the execution
of the concrete test cases derived from our abstract test cases. In particular, it is
necessary to control the order of events. First, we added more synchronizations
between different Verification Intellectual Property (VIP) events to enforce the
desired order of the events. Second, we added speed-up randomization: by default
the speed of a master for each of its channels is completely random. To express
that a master is faster than another one or to enforce an order between two
concurrent actions of a same master, we specify speed-up ranges (e.g., fast, slow,
or very slow). So doing, the speed-up remains random, but in a limited range,
ensuring the desired order.
6.2 Industrial Results
During the implementation of our abstract test cases on top of commercial VIPs,
we detected ten bugs in those VIPs. This enabled the CAD supplier to correct
the bugs before the use of these VIPs became critical in the development path
of STMicroelectronics.
Because the VIPs and the coverage lists are provided by the same CAD
supplier, some verification gaps may not be detected. In fact, the same misinter-
pretation of the ACE specification may find its way into both the VIPs and the
coverage lists. Working with a different approach led us to validate the industrial
checks (provided in the ivunits), and thanks to our directed tests we detected
unverified behaviors.
In October 2014, STMicroelectronics architects detected a limitation in the
IP implementation of the CCI. This limitation manifests in a subset of the coun-
terexamples for the data integrity property we verified 20 months before. Pre-
cisely, when the CCI initiates a memory update (e.g., see Example 1), some
parameters of this update are set to fixed values possibly loosing some impor-
tant information, and disturbing the ACE-Lite flow in the non-coherent part
of the SoC. This limitation corresponds to a gap that we have detected on the
commercial VIPs one year before, when we started experimenting with the trans-
lation of abstract to concrete test cases. Our method for computing interesting
faulty configurations (see Sec. 5.2) enabled us to provide all the scenarios trig-
gering this limitation. In addition, we wrote new PSL checks to detect those
corner cases. We should notice that our 306 extracted tests trigger those checks
16 times, whereas the other tests of the STMicroelectronics test library never
trigger these checks.
Our generated tests have direct impact on the development flow of an indus-
trial SoC of STMicroelectronics. We observe that the coverage of the verification
plan increased significantly9 and that the coverage of the svunit part of the verifi-
cation plan is complete (100%), i.e., all the aspects corresponding to system-level
behaviors are tested.
9 The coverage of the verification plan increased from 30% to 68%. Notice that 100%
coverage is not achievable for the considered SoC, because the verification plan,
as defined by the VIPs, includes some features of ACE (e.g., distributed virtual
memory), which are handled by the VIPs, but are not used by the considered SoC.
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7 Conclusion
We used a system-level formal model of a SoC to improve functional verification
in several aspects. First, we studied the sanity of a list of industrial formal checks.
We also verified principal system properties with an explicit-state model checker.
Using models containing faults, we computed a comprehensive set of interesting
configurations, which are then used to generate negative abstract tests. Those
tests were translated into RTL level through a coverage-directed test generation
platform, thus intensively test the system around corner cases.
Our approach capitalizes on existing environments while solving their limi-
tations for system-level protocols. This had an impact on an industrial SoC in
production: It helped to improve the test bench and to increase test coverage.
In addition, our approach contributed to the maturation of commercial VIPs.
Currently, we work on automating manual parts of our approach, in particu-
lar the translation of abstract test cases to the inputs of a CDTG solver. Given
the success of our approach, it seems interesting to apply this approach to the
system-level protocols in the next generation of SoCs.
Concerning reusability, our approach to assess the sanity of a check list
against a formal model is akin to crosschecking, a technique widely used in the
hardware community to improve confidence on the verification components. To
apply our test generation approach, the formal model must be configurable, so
as to violate a property. These preconditions seem acceptable, as we found modi-
fying parts of the model (e.g., some data types) feasible using simple scripts, and
the literature presents several techniques to automate the production of faulty
models.
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